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Abstract
Social and economic rights are conspicuously absent from the American Bill of 
Rights and subsequent amendments to the American Constitution. There have been 
periodic calls for the inclusion of such rights. Professor Cass Sunstein of Harvard 
Law School, currently serving as the Administrator of the White House Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, is an influential legal scholar who has argued in 
support of such rights. In a law review article and an acclaimed book, Sunstein has 
made an eloquent and impassioned plea for social and economic guarantees under 
the U.S. Constitution. While the substance of his book is unexceptionable, this essay 
seeks to make a few observations: 1) Sunstein has not adequately dealt with the 
tension between positive liberty and negative liberty represented by the two rival 
strands of republicanism that animated the American Declaration of Independence and 
the Ratification of the Constitution; 2) Sunstein cites with approval“The Directive 
Principles of State Policy”in the Indian Constitution (including an extract in the 
Appendix) as a possible means of recognition of social and economic rights. However, 
he has omitted to examine the complicated history of how the interaction between the 
social and economic rights (positive rights) embodied in the Directive Principles and 
the civil and political rights (negative rights) embodied in the chapter on“Fundamental 
Rights”have played out in the Supreme Court of India; 3) Sunstein’s favored means 
of recognition of social and economic rights is through“constitutive commitments”
rather than through constitutional amendment or judicial recognition. Such 
commitments would, perhaps, find more efficient expression in individual efforts as 
envisaged by one conception of civic republicanism, rather than through governmental 
intervention; 4) For such rights to attain constitutional status, greater scholarly 
attention is necessary to the contemporary manifestation of the social compact theory 
in the subfield of constitutional political economy within the larger discipline of public 
choice theory.
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The basis of a democratic state is liberty; which according to
the common opinion of men, can only be enjoyed in such a state;
this they affirm to be the great end of every democracy.…
Aristotle1
Liberty is not a means to a higher political end. 
It is itself the highest political end.
Lord Acton2
I. Introduction:
 The first ten amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America, 
collectively called the Bill of Rights, were ratified and came into effect on December 
15, 1791. They embody the principal rights of the people, including, among others, the 
right to free speech and expression, protection from unreasonable search and seizure, 
and protection against the deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law. The inclusion of the Bill of Rights as amendments to the Constitution was an 
act of concession to the anti-federalists who feared that the strong national government 
envisaged by the Constitution would lead to an erosion of individual rights and 
liberties. 
Conspicuously absent among the rights and liberties enumerated in the Bill 
of Rights is any mention of social and economic rights. Such social and economic 
rights would roughly mean the right to adequate housing, health care, education, or 
at least the right to appropriate work that would provide the means for a minimum 
level of subsistence. There have been seventeen subsequent amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution. None of these relate to social and economic rights. 
From time to time, there have been calls for the inclusion of such rights either 
by the process of amendment set out in Article V of the U.S. Constitution, or by the 
recognition of such rights by the United States Supreme Court. 
Professor Cass Sunstein is a prominent legal scholar who has recently espoused the 
case for social and economic rights in the United States. His principal case has been 
1  Aristotle, Politics, Book VI, Chapter 2, translated by Benjamin Jowett, available at 
http://www.constitution.org/ari/polit_06.htm.
2  Lord Acton, The History of Freedom and Other Essays, chapter 1, available at http://
files.libertyfund.org/files/75/0030_Bk.pdf.
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set out in a law review article3 and an acclaimed book, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s 
Unfinished Revolution - And Why We Need It More Than Ever.4 Also noteworthy is a recent 
collection of articles by some of the most eminent scholars of constitutional law in the 
United States. The book is entitled The Constitution in 2020.5 Among the contributors 
in the section on social and economic rights are Mark Tushnet, Frank Michelman, 
William Forbath, and Cass Sunstein.6 
The demand that such social and economic rights be recognized carries particular 
resonance at the present time. The worldwide economic crisis that followed in the 
wake of the 2007 financial crisis in the United States persists. This has led to a 
quiescence among the votaries of laissez-faire and the efficient market hypothesis. On 
3  Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic 
Guarantees?, 56 Syracuse Law Review 1 (2005), and in American Exceptionalism and 
Human Rights 90 (Michael Ignatieff editor, Princeton University Press, 2005).
4  Cass R. Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution ? And Why We 
Need it More Than Ever (Basic Books 2004).
5  The Constitution in 2020 (edited by Jack M. Balkin and Reva B. Siegel, Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
6  The book is divided into seven sections with the second section devoted to 
social and economic rights under the U.S. Constitution. In this section, inter alia, 
Sunstein makes out a case for judicial minimalism, Frank Michelman discusses 
the ramifications of economic power and the constitution, W.Forbath discusses the 
often neglected field of Constitutional Political Economy, and Mark Tushnet urges 
the need for positive social and economic rights as opposed simply to negative 
rights, that is, the right of a citizen to be free in specified spheres from governmental 
interference. Taking exception to the conservative social and political movements 
that have dominated recent American politics, the scholars included in the present 
volume collectively argue back against originalists who seek to deny the propriety 
of investing constitutional law with contemporary understandings, and instead seek 
to restore it to an imaginary pristine moment of the past. The preface avers that the 
task of vindicating the Constitution’s commitments, requires an occasional delving 
into the past but for the specific purpose of redeeming constitutional guarantees 
that have not yet been met. Declaring an adherence to redemptive constitutionalism 
which they believe to be part of an American tradition, they are committed to 
a constitution that is a work in progress. Citing the radical changes that the 
fundamental understanding of constitutional commitments have undergone over the 
past two centuries, the authors of the book are, in effect, declaring a manifesto for an 
urgent implementation of their constitutional agenda. Although some of the stances 
that they have assumed in these writings cannot be gainsaid, the papers are sparse 
on the precise details of how such economic commitments can be actually carried 
out in practice.
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the other hand, there has been a resurgence of the allure of Keynesian economics and 
a concomitant rise in the demand for governmental intervention and regulation of the 
economic affairs of the state.7 
The U.S. Constitution has exercised influence, in varying degrees, on the content 
of constitutional law in a vast number of countries around the world.8 In addition 
thereto, the“transnational judicial dialogue,”9 an evident phenomenon of recent years, 
makes constitutional developments in the United States a matter of worldwide interest. 
This paper seeks to assess the arguments favoring the expansion of constitutional 
7  See, for example, Peter Clarke, Keynes: The Rise, Fall, and Return of the Twentieth 
Century’s Most Influential Economist (Bloomsbury Pub Plc USA, 2009); The Return to 
Keynes (edited by Bradley W. Bateman, Toshiaki Hirai, and Maria Cristina Marcuzzo, 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010).
8  See generally, Constitutionalism and Rights: The Influence of the United States 
Constitution Abroad (Louis Henkin and Albert J. Rosenthal, editors, Columbia 
University Press, 1990); Charles R. Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and 
Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspectve (Chicago University Press, 1998); and Mark 
Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 Yale Law Journal 
1225 (1999). 
9  The “Transnational Judicial Dialogue” refers to the process by which courts in dif-
ferent countries engage in an exchange of ideas on the basis of comparative analysis 
and judicial comity. See: Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 Vir-
ginia Law Review 771 (1997), David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional 
Law, 49 UCLA Law Review 539 (2001), and Judges in Contemporary Democracy: An 
International Conversation (Robert Badinter and Stephen Breyer, editors, NYU Press, 
2004).  Also See: Transnational Judicial Dialogue: Strengthening Networks and Mecha-
nisms for Judicial Consultation and Cooperation, Conference Organized by the Ameri-
can Society of International Law and Harvard Law School, December 1-2, 2006. 
Available at http://www.asil.org/files/asilharvardconf.pdf. The conference description 
states:
In recent decades, a significant number of judges from around the world have 
engaged in an unprecedented dialogue on issues related to promoting judicial 
independence, accountability, and efficiency. This dialogue has taken place 
via meetings of professional associations, intergovernmental organizations and 
commissions, and other formal networks of judges and legal professionals. 
[internal citation omitted]. In addition, many judges have participated in 
delegations that visit courts and related institutions, such as law enforcement 
and judicial training centers, to learn more about how legal and judicial 
systems other than their own operate. Countless others have exchanged know-
how and expertise by participating in judicial reform and assistance projects 
and initiatives to improve judicial cooperation.
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rights in the United States to include social and economic guarantees and the 
implications that such an expansion would entail. The paper is organized in the 
following way. After this introduction, Part II sets out the gist of Cass Sunstein’s 
arguments favoring social and economic guarantees in his book and article mentioned 
above. Part III sets out the issues and implications entailed by the contents in Part II. 
Finally, Part IV sets out the conclusion.
II. Sunstein’s Case In Support of Social and Economic Guarantees:
Cass Sunstein is one of the most well-known and prolific legal scholars in the 
United States. After teaching at the University of Chicago Law School for 27 years, 
he took up a full-time appointment as Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. 
He is currently on leave, serving as the Administrator of the White House Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, which is in charge of coordinating the regulatory 
activities of the state. In his book The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution 
-And Why We Need It More Than Ever, Sunstein has made an impassioned case for 
reading social and economic guarantees in the U.S. Constitution. Following is a gist of 
Sunstein’s case. 
Sunstein’s book begins with an extended paean of praise to the leadership and 
statesmanship qualities of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.10 With unnecessary hyperbole 
Sunstein argues that the State of the Union Address delivered by Roosevelt in 1944 
was the preeminent political speech of the twentieth century because of its espousal 
of social and economic rights. In Sunstein’s view, it was tantamount to a manifesto 
to make real a second Bill of Rights in addition to the first one ratified in 1791 along 
with the subsequent amendments. The ideas advanced in this speech have been 
crystallized in much subsequent legislation in following decades. They have also been 
instrumental in the shaping of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was 
ratified in the year 1948 and the International Convention of Social and Economic 
Rights which was ratified in 1948. These, in turn, have been important influences in 
the shaping of constitutions around the world in following years. 
He makes a connection between Roosevelt’s vaunted speech of 1944 and his earlier 
more famous speech delivered in 1941 in which he listed his commitment to the four 
freedoms. However, Sunstein goes to lengths to emphasize that Roosevelt’s commitment 
10 Sunstein, supra note 4, Part I, at 9-98.
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to economic rights did not stem from any egalitarian impulse but rather from his 
commitment to freedom. Roosevelt was as fervently committed to the principle of 
individualism as any other person. However, he equally believed that true freedom 
required absence from want.11 
Sunstein regrets that Roosevelt’s urging for a second bill of rights remained 
largely unknown in the United States even though it exercised unusual international 
influence. It was through the leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt that the ideas embodied 
in the 1944 speech found their expression in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and also in the International Convention of Social and Economic Rights. 
Sunstein seeks to explore the question of why social and economic rights have not 
received constitutional recognition in America. He acknowledges and refutes the 
most commonly offered arguments, namely, (i) the historical period in which the 
Constitution came into effect,12 (ii) American exceptionalism,13 and (iii) American 
Pragmatism.14 He makes out a case that the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl 
Warren was edging in the direction of granting constitutional recognition for social and 
economic rights, but that this was thwarted by the results of the presidential election 
of 1968 which led to the election of a conservative president and which in turn led to 
the packing of the Court with nominees inclined to favor conservative policies.15 
Sunstein’s favored mode of according constitutional status to social and economic 
rights is through what he terms“constitutive commitments”and not through the more 
conventional mode of constitutional amendment or through the judicial recognition of 
such rights. He explains such rights as having“a special place in the sense that they 
11 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 2.
12 Id. at 109-126
13 Id. at 127-138.
14 Id. at 139-148.
15 Id. at 149- 174. Martha Nussbaum has, in a recent significant law review article 
advocating a “capabilities approach” to the reading of the U.S.Constitution made 
out a similar argument that economic and social rights narrowly missed out on 
becoming a part of the constitutive commitment of the U.S.Constitution because of 
a change in the composition of the court and a consequent swing away from the 
liberal predilection of the Warren Court to a decidedly conservative predilection 
during the era presided over by Chief Justice Rehnquist. See Martha Nussbaum, 
Constitutions and Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 Harvard Law 
Review 4 (2007).
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are widely accepted and cannot be eliminated without a fundamental change in social 
understanding. They are genuinely constitutive in the sense that they help create, 
or constitute, a society’s basic values.”16 Although he prefers the use of a neologism, 
it is clear that he places them on at least on an equal footing with conventionally 
described constitutional rights. In his view constitutional rights are“a subset of the 
broader category of constitutive commitments”17 and this category is distinct from“the 
interests and rights protected through ordinary law and policy.”18
III. Issues Arising from Sunstein’ s Arguments:
In this section is a brief discussion of some of the salient issues relating to the 
arguments advanced by Professor Sunstein.
A. The Two Strands of Classical Republicanism:
Professor Sunstein gives short shrift to the often drawn distinction between 
positive and negative rights. Negative rights are freedom from governmental 
interference whereas positive rights imply the freedom to do something, carrying 
with it the often implied corollary that it necessarily requires the ability to do that 
something. Thus negative rights require the government to abstain from doing certain 
acts, whereas positive rights require a more active role on behalf of the government 
requiring the government to provide for the welfare of the citizens. Sunstein dismisses 
this distinction as misguided inasmuch as negative rights also require a positive role 
on behalf of the government to provide for their protection. 
However, Sunstein does not deal with the perennial tension that exists between 
these two forms of rights. The tension between positive and negative liberty can 
be traced back to two conflicting strands of classical republicanism which was the 
animating ideology that informed the American Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution of the United States.19 Two rival schools of thought champion one over 
16 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 62.
17 Sunstein, id., at 63.
18 Sunstein, id., at 62.
19 Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development, at 
70 (Norton,1983); Richard Vetterli and Gary Bryner, In Search of the Republic: Public 
Virtue and the Roots of American Government (Rowman and Littlefield, 1987).
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the other as the dominant understanding of republicanism at the birth of the American 
Republic.20 
The libertarian strand, derived from the writings of John Locke, has been most 
famously championed by Louis Hartz in The Liberal Tradition in America.21 Hartz 
contends that the dominant set of beliefs at the time of the American founding were 
an unshakeable belief in individualism, property rights, and limited government. 
Opposed to the libertarian idea are those who champion the cause of civic 
republicanism as being the principle that animated the founding of the American 
republic. This thesis has been most famously championed by Bernard Bailyn in The 
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution22 and Gordon S. Wood in The Creation 
of the American Republic.23 The proponents of civic republicanism champion the 
interests of society at large as opposed to that of the individual, place emphasis on the 
individual’s obligation to society, and view property rights as principally a means to 
serve the public good. According to Wood, these are the principles that formed“the 
essence of republicanism and comprehended for Americans the idealistic goal of their 
Revolution.”24 
It is evident that an emphasis on the libertarian strand of republicanism would 
lead to a greater insistence on the primacy of negative rights, while an emphasis on 
the civic republican strand of republicanism would lead to a greater emphasis on the 
primacy of positive rights. It is equally evident that both strands epitomize values of 
paramount importance. Striking the right balance between the two should be the ideal 
to be aimed for. However, this is not easily done. The constitutionalization of both 
forms of rights vests the responsibility of striking the right balance on the national 
government. It would complicate the task of governance manifold.
B. The Interplay Between Fundamental Rights and The Directive Principles of State 
20 See e.g., Richard Ellis, American Political Cultures (Oxford University Press, 1993); 
and Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and 
Comparative Perspective (Transaction Publishers, 2003).  
21 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (Harcourt, Brace,1955) 
22 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Republic (Harvard University 
Press, 1967).
23 Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (The University of North 
Carolina Press,1969). 
24 Gordon S. Wood, id., at 53.
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Policy Under the Indian Constitution:
Professor Sunstein cites with apparent approval Chapter IV of the Indian 
Constitution embodying the“Directive Principles of State Policy”as an example of a 
national constitution’s recognition of social and economic rights.25 He even reproduces 
an extract in the Appendix of his book.26 
Professor Sunstein’s enthusiasm for the Directive Principles of State Policy should 
be tempered with some realistic regard to the tortuous path that governmental efforts 
to implement its edicts have taken over the past sixty years. A chronicle of this period 
evidences the value pluralistic conflict that inheres between the civil and political 
rights guaranteed as fundamental under the Indian Constitution, and the economic and 
social concerns embodied in the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP).
　　　　       
1. The Scheme of the Indian Constitution:
First, a brief mention of the relevant provisions of the Indian Constitution. 
a. Fundamental Rights:
The fundamental rights of the citizens of India are set out in Part III entitled 
“Fundamental Rights.”This part runs from Article 12 to Article 35. Article 13 (2) 
states:
The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights 
conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause 
shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. 
The rights included in this part are classified in sub-categories: Right to Equality, 
Right to Freedom, Right against Exploitation, Right to Freedom of Religion, Cultural 
and Educational Rights, and the Right to Constitutional Remedies. Article 31 sets out 
that certain laws are immune to attack on the grounds of their being inconsistent with 
the fundamental rights. 
The power of judicial review is set out under the rubric“Right to Constitutional 
Remedies,”and is set out in Article 32. Article 32 (1) states:
The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the 
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is  guaranteed. 
25 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 103, 104, 143, 181, 182, 213, 217, and 219.
26 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 255 to 257.
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b. The Directive Principles of State Policy:
The DPSP are set out in Part IV of the Constitution. This part runs from article 36 
to Article 50. Article 37 states:
The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any 
court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in 
the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply 
these principles in making law. 
The DPSP contain provisions, inter alia, relating to the promotion of the social 
and economic welfare of the people. 
       
c.. Amendment:
Part XX containing Article 368, relates to the amendment of the Constitution. 
Article 368 (1) states:
Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may in exercise 
of its constituent power amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any 
provision of this Constitution in accordance with the procedure laid down 
in this article. 
2. The Development of the Jurisprudence Relating to Constitutional Rights Under 
the Indian Constitution:
The following is a very brief outline of the major developments in the 
constitutional history of India as they relate to the interplay between the Fundamental 
Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy.
The Constitution of India was adopted and enacted on November 6, 1949. From 
that date up to December 2007, the Constitution has been amended ninety-four times. 
The most contentious of these amendments have been in respect of provisions relating 
to the Fundamental Rights guaranteed to the citizens and the Directive Principles of 
State Policy. The Supreme Court of India has been called upon to resolve the issues 
arising from these amendments. It has done so in a cavalcade of landmark judgments.
The opening salvo came with the Constitution (First Amendment) Bill of 1951. 
The first sentence of the Statement of Objects and Reasons read:“During the last 
fifteen months of the working of the Constitution, certain difficulties have been brought 
to light by judicial decisions and pronouncements specially in regard to the chapter on 
fundamental rights.”One of the main difficulties related to the perceived impediment 
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to certain social and agrarian reforms. To remedy this, certain amendments were 
introduced. Among these was the addition of the Ninth Schedule by means of the 
addition of Article 31B, which read: 
“31B. Validation of certain Acts and Regulations.-Without prejudice to the 
generality of the provisions contained in article 31A, none of the Acts and 
Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof 
shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground 
that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away 
or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and 
notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the 
contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of 
any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force.”27
This effectively put all legislation listed in the Ninth Schedule beyond the pale of 
judicial review. The constitutional validity of the First Amendment Act was called into 
question before the Supreme Court. The Court held that a constitutional amendment is 
not law within the meaning of Article 13(2) and therefore did not violate the provision 
of that article. Effectively, fundamental rights could be abridged by constitutional 
amendment.28 The substance of this ruling was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 
196529 in respect of the 17th Amendment Act of 1964. 
These were the precursors to one of the Supreme Court’s fabled judgments in 
the Golaknath case.30 In this case, for the first time ever, a bench of 11 judges of the 
Supreme Court was convened to consider whether the fundamental rights could be 
amended. Reversing its earlier position, the Court ruled by a narrow majority of 6 to 
5 that a constitutional amendment was law within the meaning of Article 13(2) and 
therefore any amendment which sought to“take away or abridge”a fundamental 
right violated the constitution. 
In order to overcome this restriction on its power, parliament introduced certain 
27 Amended Article 31B under the First Amendment Bill. Available at 
  http://india.gov.in/govt/documents/amendment/amend1.htm.
28 Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (AIR 1951 SC 458).
29 Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1965 SC 845).
30 Golaknath v. State of Punjab (AIR 1967 SC 1643).
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key amendments to the constitution through the Constitution (Twenty-fourth 
Amendment) Act 1971, the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act 1971, the 
Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) Act 1971, and the Constitution (Twenty-ninth 
Amendment) Act, 1972. 
The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Twenty-fourth amendment Bill was 
remarkably explicit about its purpose. It read:       
The Supreme Court in the well-known Golak Nath’s case [1967, 2 S.C.R. 
762] reversed, by a narrow majority, its own earlier decisions upholding the 
power of Parliament to amend all parts of the Constitution including Part III 
relating to fundamental rights. The result of the judgment is that Parliament is 
considered to have no power to take away or curtail any of the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution even if it becomes necessary 
to do so for giving effect to the Directive Principles of State Policy and for the 
attainment of the objectives set out in the Preamble to the Constitution. It is, 
therefore, considered necessary to provide expressly that Parliament has power 
to amend any provision of the Constitution so as to include the provisions of 
Part III within the scope of the amending power. 
2. The Bill seeks to amend article 368 suitably for the purpose and makes 
it clear that article 368 provides for amendment of the Constitution as well 
as procedure therefor. The Bill further provides that when a Constitution 
Amendment Bill passed by both Houses of Parliament is presented to the 
President for his assent, he should give his assent thereto.The Bill also seeks to 
amend article 13 of the Constitution to make it inapplicable to any amendment 
of the Constitution under article 368.31
The constitutional validity of the aforesaid amendments came up for consideration 
of the Supreme Court in the Kesavananda Bharati case.32 A 13-judge bench was 
constituted for the purpose of deciding this case. The judges delivered eleven separate 
judgments running into over 1000 printed pages. Collectively, they were a complex 
31 Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Constitution (Twenty-fourth 
Amendment) Bill, 1971.
   Available at: http://india.gov.in/govt/documents/amendment/amend24.htm.
32 Kesavananda Bharati v. The State of Kerala and Others, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
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mélange of judgments, and the ruling of the Court was not readily discernible. To 
clear the potential confusion, nine judges issued a signed statement titled“The view 
of the majority.”In effect, the ruling of the Court was that the Court’s earlier ruling in 
the Golaknath case was overruled. That meant that the fundamental rights were not, 
ipso facto, beyond Parliament’s power to amend. However, it was held that Parliament 
had no power to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. Thus came 
into being the fabled doctrine of the“basic structure”of the Indian Constitution. This 
did little to clear the confusion, because there was no unanimity among the judges as 
to what constituted the basic structure of the constitution.
In response to the imposition of this restriction on parliament’s power to amend 
the constitution, the forty-second amendment was enacted in 1976. Once again, the 
Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill was clear. In part, Clause 3 of 
the Bill read:
3. It is, therefore, proposed to amend the Constitution to spell out expressly the 
high ideals of socialism, secularism and the integrity of the nation, to make the 
directive principles more comprehensive and give them precedence over those 
fundamental rights which have been allowed to be relied upon to frustrate 
socio-economic reforms for implementing the directive principles....33
In effect, among other things, the amendment provided that there would be no 
limitation whatsoever on Parliament’s power to amend the constitution. The validity 
of the forty-second amendment was called into question before the Supreme Court in 
1980 in the Minerva Mills case.34 The case was decided by a five-judge bench. By a 
majority of four to one, the Court relied upon the“basic structure”doctrine laid down 
in the Kesavananda Bharati case, and struck down as unconstitutional those provisions 
of the forty-second amendment that gave Parliament absolute power to amend the 
Constitution. The Court also examined the question whether the Directive Principles of 
State Policy could have primacy over fundamental rights. The majority judgment and 
33 Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Constitution (Forty-fourth 
Amendment) Bill, 1976, which was enacted as the The Constitution (Forty-second 
Amendment Act, 1976). Available at: http://india.gov.in/govt/documents/amendment/
amend42.htm.
34 Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, 1980 AIR 1789.
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the dissenting judgments provide in stark relief the opposing views on this question.
In the relevant part, the majority judgment stated:
(5) The importance of Directive Principles in the scheme of our 
Constitution cannot ever be over-emphasized. Those principles project 
the high ideal which the Constitution aims to achieve. In fact Directive 
Principles of State Policy are fundamental in governance of the 
country and there is no sphere of public life where delay can defeat 
justice with more telling effect than the one in which the common man 
seeks the realisation of his aspirations. But to destroy the guarantees 
given by Part III in order purportedly to achieve the goals of Part IV 
is plainly to subvert the Constitution by destroying its basic structure. 
Fundamental rights occupy a unique place in the lives. of civilized 
societies and have been variously described as“transcendental”,
“inalienable”and“primordial”....
  ...Parts III and IV are like ... a twin formula for achieving the 
social revolution which is the ideal which the visionary founders of 
the Constitution set before themselves. In other words, the Indian 
Constitution is founded on the bedrock of the balance between Parts 
III and IV. To give absolute primacy to one over the other is to 
disturb the harmony of the Constitution. This harmony and balance 
between fundamental rights and directive principles is an essential 
feature of the basic structure of the Constitution. [255B-D]   The edifice 
of Indian Constitution is built upon the concepts crystallized in the 
Preamble. Having resolved to constitute ourselves into a Socialist 
State which carried with it the obligation to secure to our people 
justice social, economic and political, Part IV has been put into our 
Constitution containing directive principles of State Policy which 
specify the socialistic goal to be achieved. Having promised the people 
a democratic polity which carries with it the obligation of securing 
to the people liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship, 
equality of status and of opportunity and the assurance that the dignity 
of the individual will at all costs be preserved, Part III has been put in 
our Constitution, conferring those rights on the people. Those rights 
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are not an end in themselves but are the means to an end. The end 
is specified in Part IV. Therefore, the rights conferred by Part III are 
subject to reasonable restrictions and the Constitution provides that 
enforcement of some of them may, in stated uncommon circumstances, 
be suspended. But just as the rights conferred by Part III would be 
without a radar and a compass if they were not geared to an ideal, in 
the same manner the attainment of the ideals set out in Part IV would 
become a pretence for tyranny if tho price to be paid for achieving that 
ideal is human freedoms....35
In contrast, the dissenting judge stated, in part:
(i) It is not correct to say that Fundamental Rights alone are based on 
Human Rights while Directive Principles fall in some category other 
than Human Rights. Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles 
cannot be fitted in two distinct and strictly defined categories. Broadly 
stated, Fundamental Rights represent civil and political rights, while 
Directive Principles embody social and economic rights. Both are 
clearly part of broad spectrum of human rights....
(v) The Indian Constitution is first and foremost a social document...  
The Fundamental Rights are no doubt important and valuable in a 
democracy, but there can be no real democracy without social and 
economic justice to the common man and to create socio-economic 
conditions in which there can be social and economic justice to 
everyone, is the theme of the Directive Principles. It is the Directive 
Principles which nourish the roots of a democracy, provide strength 
and vigour to it and attempt to make it a real participatory democracy 
which does not remain merely a political democracy but also becomes 
a social and economic democracy with Fundamental Rights available 
to all irrespective of their power, position or wealth. The dynamic 
provisions of the Directive Principles fertilise the static provisions of 
the Fundamental Rights. The object of the Fundamental Rights is to 
35 Per Chandrachud C.J. id.
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protect individual liberty, but individual liberty cannot be considered 
in isolation from the socio-economic structure in which it is to operate. 
There is a real connection between individual liberty and the shape 
and form of the social and economic structure of the society... The 
real controversies in the present day society are not between power 
and freedom but between one form of liberty and another. Under 
the present socio-economic system, it is the liberty of the few which 
is in conflict with the liberty of the many. The Directive Principles, 
therefore, impose an obligation on the State to take positive action 
for creating socio-economic conditions in which there will be an 
egalitarian social order with social and economic justice to all so that 
individual liberty will become a cherished value and the dignity of the 
individual a living reality, not only for a few privileged persons but for 
the entire people of the country....36
Most recently, the continuing tussle between the Fundamental Rights and the 
Directive Principles of State Policy was played out in the Coelho case.37 At issue, 
inter alia, was whether Parliament could render legislation which impinged upon 
fundamental rights immune from judicial scrutiny by placing it in the Ninth Schedule 
(which had been specifically created by the first amendment in 1951 to put certain 
legislation beyond the pale of judicial review). Relying upon the Kesavananda Bharti 
ruling, a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that after 24th April 1973 (the 
date of the Kesavananda Bharati judgment), if any fundamental rights were affected, 
the constitutional validity of the legislation would be tested upon the touchstone of 
whether the“basic structure”of the constitution had been violated, notwithstanding 
the fact that they had been placed in the Ninth Schedule. On the specific point about 
the relationship between the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles, the Court 
stated:
  Regarding the status and stature in respect of fundamental rights in 
Constitutional scheme, it is to be remembered that Fundamental Rights 
36 Per Bhagwati J., id.
37  I.R.Coelho v. Union of India, (2007) 2 SCC 1, AIR 2007 SC 861.
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are those rights of citizens or those negative obligations of the State 
which do not permit encroachment on individual liberties. The State is 
to deny no one equality before the law.
  The object of the Fundamental Rights is to foster the social revolution 
by creating a society egalitarian to the extent that all citizens are to 
be equally free from coercion or restriction by the State. By enacting 
Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles which are negative and 
positive obligations of the States, the Constituent Assembly made it 
the responsibility of the Government to adopt a middle path between 
individual liberty and public good. Fundamental Rights and Directive 
Principles have to be balanced. That balance can be tilted in favour 
of the public good. The balance, however, cannot be overturned by 
completely overriding individual liberty. This balance is an essential 
feature of the Constitution.38
It is evident that the inclusion of the Directive Principles of State Policy, although 
seemingly a benign statement of good objectives, has led to unexpected difficulties. 
In its zeal to give effect to the laudable objectives set out in the Directive Principles, 
parliament has tended to overstep the bounds of constitutional legitimacy and in 
the process impinged upon individual liberties. The fact of the power of judicial 
review having been codified in the Indian Constitution has facilitated the task of the 
Supreme Court in keeping Parliamentary overreaching in bounds. In a nation where 
judicial review is derived from judicial precedent and tradition, courts would have the 
additional burden of fending off the charge of countermajoritarianism. 
Sunstein states that India has realized the difficulty of judicial enforcement of 
economic and social rights.39 However, it is evident that the constitutional history 
of the past sixty years has revealed a concomitant difficulty of judicially imposed 
restraint on parliamentary overreaching.
C. The Non-governmental Conception of Civic Republicanism:
The brief chronicle of the Indian experience reveals the difficulty of investing the 
38 Per Y.K. Sabharwal, C.J., id.
39 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 143.
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government with the task of giving effect to the civil and political rights, and at the 
same time, social and economic rights as well. 
This leads to the thought that Sunstein’s favored“constitutive commitments”
could be realized in more efficient and non-controversial ways through private efforts 
rather than through governmental intervention. This would be in line with the 
view urged by Gary Bryner and Richard Vetterli that for the founders, acts of public 
beneficence“were not to be provided for through national governmental institutions..., 
but through private efforts and primary institutions, supported by local government.”40
Such an interpretation could also be plausibly made from the preamble to the U.S. 
Constitution, which reads:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, 
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the Common defense, 
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves 
and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United 
States of America.41 
Although promotion of the general welfare and the securing of liberty are both 
mentioned in the preamble to the Constitution which was ratified in 1889, it was only 
liberty that was guaranteed protection in the Bill of Rights that was ratified in 1891.
D. The Social Compact Theory and the Discipline of Constitutional Economics:
Sunstein makes a fleeting mention of the social contract theory of government.42 
But he chooses not to engage with it in any meaningful way. Thereby he does 
disservice to his cause, because it is the social contract theory also called the social 
compact theory, that points the way to any realistic prospect of the social and 
economic rights entering into the constitutional ambit.  
The Social Compact is another of the foundational concepts that provided the 
underpinning of the American Constitution. Derived from the writings of John Locke, 
it found a succinct expression in Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence:
40 Gary Bryner and Richard Vetterli, In Search of the Republic: Public Virtue and the Roots 
of the American Government 8-9 (Rowman and Littlefield, 1987).
41 Preamble to the Constitution of the United States. Available at
   http://www.usconstitution.net/const.html.
42 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 202.
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“....That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving 
their just powers from the consent of the governed....”43 The Federalist #21 makes a 
reference to the social compact between the states,44 and at the 1787 Constitutional 
Convention, James Madison declared that the purpose of the Convention was to craft
“a compact by which an authority was created paramount to the parties, and making 
laws for the government of them.”45
The subfield of constitutional political economy within the larger discipline of 
public choice theory is the modern heir to the social compact theory. It seeks to 
find normative answers to the question of how human beings can live together in 
a harmonious social order. One of its pioneering scholars, James M. Buchanan, was 
awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1986. As he stated in his Nobel Prize 
acceptance speech:
The purpose of the contractarian exercise is not explanatory.... It 
is,...,justificatory in that it offers a basis for normative evaluation. Could the 
observed rules that constrain the activity of ordinary politics have emerged 
from agreement in constitutional contract? To the extent that this question 
can be affirmatively answered we have established a legitimating linkage 
between the individual and the state. To the extent that this question 
prompts a negative response, we have a basis for normative criticism of the 
existing order, and a criterion for advancing proposals for constitutional 
reform.46
The essential substance of the theory undergirding modern constitutional political 
economy, also described as constitutional economics, is set out in The Calculus of Consent47 
43 The American Declaration of Independence, available at
   http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/document.
44 The Federalist Papers, available at
http://www.conservativetruth.org/library/fed21.html.
45 Constitutional Convention Debates, 1787, available at
http://www.constitution.org/dfc/. 
46 J. M. Buchanan Jr. － Prize Lecture. Nobelprize.org.
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1986/buchanan-lecture.html.
47 James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (University of 
Michigan Press, 1962).
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and The Reason of Rules.48 Although research in the field of constitutional economics 
has been growing rapidly,49 there is as yet a paucity of any substantial scholarship 
relating to the specific topic of social and economic rights.
It is in the field of constitutional political economy that serious scholarship will 
need to be done as to the conditions under which a substantial political consensus will 
be formed to support the constitutionalization of social and economic rights.
It is, after all, from the consent of the individuals that make up the polity that 
constitutional changes can get legitimacy and support. There is no obvious sign that 
America is headed toward a“constitutional moment”whereby a surge of the popular 
will is about to propel social and economic rights into the realm of constitutional 
status.50
IV. Conclusion:
What, then, would be the implications of the expansion of constitutional rights in 
the United States to include social and economic rights?
Professor Sunstein makes an eloquent plea for social and economic guarantees in 
the form of constitutive commitments. His case is, for the most part, unexceptionable. 
Social and economic guarantees alongside with civil and political rights would be an 
48 James Buchanan and Geoffrey Brennan, The Reason of Rules (Cambridge University 
Press, 1985).
49 For a recent survey, see, Stefan Voigt, Positive Constitutional Economics-A Survey of 
Recent Developments, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1358508.
50 The concept of “constitutional moments” was most famously propounded by Bruce 
Ackerman in We the People: Foundations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991) 
and We the People: Transformations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
In Ackerman’s reckoning, constitutional moments refer to certain transformational 
periods when popular social and political movements are at the vanguard of 
constitutional change. They represent the quintessence of popular sovereignty 
and effectuate constitutional change while circumventing the onerous procedural 
difficulty set out in Article V of the U.S. Constitution. Also relevant in this context 
is the idea of “popular constitutionalism.” Broadly stated, this idea encapsulates 
the notion that the meaning and content of constitutional provisions should reflect 
popular understanding and aspirations. The most well-known exposition of this idea 
has been by Larry D. Kramer in The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 
115 Harvard Law Review 4 (2001); and also by Larry D. Kramer in  The People 
Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (Oxford University Press, 
2004).
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ideal worth aiming for. However, it cannot be gainsaid that there is an unavoidable 
inherent tension between these two sets of interests. They stem from different 
Weltanschauungen. The demand for civil and political rights is derived from a viewpoint 
that places greater value on individual liberty than on societal good. The demand for 
social and economic rights is derived from a worldview that places greater primacy 
on societal good than on individual liberty. These are two different worldviews. Both 
have much to commend them. Both could have their source in genuinely humanistic 
concerns. Although it is desirable to think of them as complementary, the fact is that 
they are sometimes contradictory. It would be wonderful to strike a balance between 
the two at all times. But this is no easy matter. 
It is not particularly bad then that one set of rights should have a presumptive 
primacy over the other, and that this primacy be institutionalized in the written 
constitution. There is a strong case to be made that given a choice, it is infinitely 
safer to tilt the balance in favor of individual rights. To raise social and economic 
guarantees to a constitutional level would be to put them on an equal footing with 
civil and political rights. This would require the executive and legislature at all times 
to find a via media between the two, a task of exceeding difficulty. Furthermore, it 
would call upon the courts to second-guess the legislative choices at every step due 
to the constitutional challenges that the choices are sure to provoke. This would 
compound the countermajoritarian problem inherent in judicial review. 
Professor Sunstein has made an elaborate political case for constitutional 
recognition of social and economic rights. However, any move to actualize this 
aspiration whether through constitutional amendment, judicial recognition, or nebulous
“constitutive commitments”will inevitably entail tumultuous social, economic, 
political, and cultural repercussions. Due care and regard for these effects would be in 
order. 
Constitutive commitments to secure social and economic rights will carry a high 
price. This requires not only widespread popular support in principle but also informed 
consent to the costs that it will entail. Constitutive commitments cannot be decreed by 
governmental fiat. They will only arise from a widespread popular will to change the 
terms of the social compact in the belief that constitutionalizing such rights will serve 
the cause of“a more perfect Union.”
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憲法的権利の拡大とその影響
ダタール　ニティン
九州女子大学共通教育機構、北九州市八幡西区自由ヶ丘1-1（〒807-8586）
（2010年10月5日受付、2010年11月9日受理）
要　約
　社会的経済的権利は、アメリカ合衆国権利章典とその後のアメリカ合衆国憲法修正条項か
ら、著しく欠けている。そのような権利を含める要請が定期的になされてきた。ハーバー
ド・ロースクールの教授であり、現在ホワイトハウスでOffice of Information and 
Regulatory の行政官であるCass Sunsteinは、そのような権利をサポートするように議論し
ている、影響力のある法学者の一人である。法学の論文のレビューや賞賛された本の中で
Sunsteinは、アメリカ合衆国憲法下での社会的経済的保証のための、説得力があり、情熱の
こもった主張をしている。彼の本の内容は、非の打ち所がないものであるが、この論文では、
いくつかの所見を述べたいと思う：１）Sunsteinは、アメリカ独立宣言と憲法承認に活気を
起こした2つの共和主義のライバルによって表された、ポジティブな自由とネガティブな自
由の間の緊張を適切に扱っていないこと、２）Sunsteinは、社会的経済的権利の容認のでき
うる限りの手段として、インド憲法（目次に引用を含む）における“The Directive 
Principles of State Policy”に賛同している。しかしながら、彼は、Directive Principlesに
体現された社会的経済的権利（ポジティブな権利）と“Fundamental Rights”のインド最
高裁での役割における章に体現される市民・政治的権利（ネガティブな権利）のやりとり間
でどのような複雑な歴史があったのかを調査するのを省いている。３）Sunsteinが好感を
持っている社会的経済的権利の容認手段は、憲法修正案や法的承認を通してというよりもむ
しろ、“constitutive commitments（憲法的関与）”を通してである。そのような関与は、
政府の介入というよりもむしろ、おそらく、市民の共和主義の一つの概念によって心に描か
れたものとしての個人の努力に、より有効な表現を見出すであろう。４）そのような権利で
憲法の状態に達するために、public choice理論のより広い原則の中の憲法学的政治的経済
の副分野での現代の社会的契約理論の表現に多大な学問的注意を払うことが必要である。
